Home / A. Sentience and moral status / Part DIR
"It's natural to put our own first."
partiality lets us prefer; it doesn't let us exploit. We may save our own child first in a fire, but that doesn't authorize us to hurt the neighbor's child so ours can have a snack. The argument swaps a case of tragic conflict, where only one can be saved, for an everyday practice where there's no conflict at all: eating animals saves no human.
Short answer
Preferring our own is normal and legitimate in real conflicts: in a fire, I can save my child before a stranger. But preferring isn't the same as being allowed to exploit. No one thinks loving your own child authorizes hurting the neighbor's child. And eating animals isn't a tragic conflict: no human is saved when someone picks chicken over beans.
For children
Everyone loves their own family most, and that's good. If your mum and a stranger needed help at the same time, you'd help your mum first. But loving your family more doesn't let you hurt other people's families. It's the same with animals: loving people more doesn't let anyone hurt a little pig just because he isn't part of our family.
"Does loving your own family authorize you to hurt other people's families?"
Como pode aparecer
"My family first, then everyone else."
"Species is family."
"It's natural to protect our own."
"I'd rather save one child than a thousand cows."
"Would you save your child or a pig?" (which is F2)
"Humans first."
"Special relationships generate special duties, and humanity is one of them."
"Everyone looks after their own."
The strongest version
"My family first, then everyone else. It's natural to look after our own first."
Strongest version (steelman):
- P1We have special duties to those close to us: family, friends, community.
- P2The species is our widest community, and solidarity among humans is one of those special bonds.
- P3Those with a special bond to us may be given priority over those without one.
- CSo we may prioritize human interests over animals' interests.
P1 is true, and moral philosophy takes it seriously: an ethics demanding total indifference between your own child and a stranger would be unrealistic. The problem lies in P2 and, above all, in what the conclusion authorizes.
The argument is valid if the conclusion is "we may give priority in conflicts". It fails when the conclusion becomes "we may use outsiders as we please", which is what the practice requires.
Full answer
- a
Reconstruction and diagnosis
The argument merges two different things:
What partiality permits What partiality doesn't permit Giving priority to those close to us when we can't help everyone Harming outsiders to get a smaller benefit Devoting more time and resources to those we love Treating outsiders as resources Saving your own child first in a fire Hurting the neighbor's child so ours can play Priority applies in situations of tragic conflict, where only one can be helped. Consuming animals isn't one of them: on one side is the animal's life, on the other a menu preference.
- b
Where the argument breaks
1. Preferring isn't exploiting.
Partiality is a permission to favor those close to us, not a license to harm those far away. Parents who love their children don't thereby gain the right to attack other children.
2. There's no conflict.
Eating animals saves no human. The comparison with the fire, where only one can be saved, doesn't describe a supermarket choice (F2).
3. The species isn't a family.
Special bonds arise from real relationships: living together, care, dependence. The species is a biological category grouping billions of strangers. Many people have a stronger bond with their own dog than with any human on another continent.
4. The same logic has already justified the worst.
"Our own first" has been used to justify excluding foreigners, other ethnic groups and other groups. The circle of "our own" has always been drawn by those inside it.
5. The argument concedes the essential point.
If animals need to be put "after", then they're in the queue. That already admits their interests count, and the question becomes how to weigh them, not whether they can be ignored.
- c
Data and sources
Source What it says Note Caviola, Everett and Faber, 2019 Speciesism, measured on its own scale, correlates with racism, sexism and social dominance orientation Shows that "our own first" has the same structure as other group preferences Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality", in *Moral Luck* (1981) Argues that personal relationships justify partiality, with the example of saving one's own wife The philosophical basis of the strong version; the wife example is summarized in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry "Impartiality" - d
The strongest counter-reply: the human moral community
The most serious version doesn't talk about family. It says morality arose among humans to regulate life in common, and it's reasonable for members of that community to have stronger duties to each other. Animals would be protected by weaker duties, but wouldn't have the same priority.
- e
Why the counter-reply doesn't reach the conclusion
Weaker duties are still duties.
Even on this view, causing suffering and death for the pleasure of taste doesn't pass the minimum filter.
The moral community has always expanded.
It once excluded women, foreigners and enslaved people, and each expansion was later recognized as a correction (A9).
Those who can't take part are already protected.
Babies and people with profound cognitive disabilities aren't party to any agreement, and no one accepts leaving them with "weaker" duties (A7).
Priority in conflict isn't the case under discussion.
Even if granted, it doesn't apply to a practice without conflict.
Reasoning errors
Logical
Is the form valid?
Changing the question
False analogy
Epistemological
Does the evidence support it?
Category treated as a bond
Moral
Is the criterion coherent?
Partiality as a license
A circle drawn by those inside it
Biases
Emotional proximity
What's close weighs more, regardless of seriousness
Literature on the identifiable victim effect
Rationalization through the 4Ns
Human priority works as a ready-made justification
Extrapolations
The principle being tested is: "those who are our own may use those who aren't for smaller benefits".
If it applied to…FamiliesTap to see
Parents could hurt other people's children for the benefit of their own
No one accepts this
If it applied to…NationsTap to see
Foreigners could be exploited by nationals
It's the logic of colonialism
If it applied to…Ethnic groupsTap to see
The majority group could use the others
Recognized as racism
If it applied to…SpeciesTap to see
A stronger species could use us
Whoever rejects this rejects the premise
Contradictions
Loving your children has never justified hurting the neighbor's children.
Real bonds don't follow the species boundary.
The same phrase, applied to nationality or ethnicity, is recognized as prejudice.
No one stops helping a human by not eating meat.
What the argument gets right
What is true
Partiality is a legitimate part of moral life. Loving your own family more, caring first for those nearby and giving priority to those close to you in real conflicts are things any reasonable ethics has to accommodate.
But
But partiality only authorizes preferring when we can't help everyone. It has never authorized harming those outside the circle for lesser gains. Animals may not be part of our family, and that doesn't give us the right to treat them as food.
Connections
Usually comes before
Usually comes after
Go deeper in Questão de Ética
Chapters from the open-access collection A Journey Through Animal Ethics that discuss this argument in more detail:
- If Speciesism Is Natural, Is Speciesism Justified? Vol. I, ch. 8
References
Philosophy
- Persons, Character and Morality, in Moral Luck.
- The Expanding Circle.