Home / A. Sentience and moral status / Part DIR
"Morality exists to protect us from each other"
if morality applied only to those who can threaten or repay us, it would also leave out babies, children and incapacitated people, and no one accepts that. Besides, explaining how a practice arose doesn't show it's right: the first astronomers got things wrong too. And it's false that people only respect those they fear: many people protect precisely those who can't defend themselves.
Short answer
If morality applied only to those who can threaten us, babies and incapacitated people would be left out too, and no one accepts that. And even if morality began as an agreement for protection, the origin of an idea doesn't prove it's right. Astronomy also began full of mistakes. The question is whether it's fair to make suffer those who can't defend themselves.
For children
A baby can't hit anyone or make promises. Even so, everyone knows it's very wrong to hurt a baby. So we're not good to others only because they can hit back. We look after those who are weak precisely because they can't defend themselves. Animals can't either.
"Do you think you only owe respect to those who can hit back?"
Como pode aparecer
"Morality exists to protect us from each other; animals aren't a threat."
"Ethics is a contract between humans."
"Deep down, everyone only respects those who can hit back."
"Morality is a system of cooperation between rational, self-interested agents."
"No duties, no rights." (which is A7)
"Rights are a human invention, only for humans." (which is A9)
The strongest version
"Morality is an agreement between people so no one harms anyone. Animals aren't part of the deal, because they can't threaten us."
Strongest version (steelman):
- P1Morality arose and exists as an agreement of mutual protection between individuals who can harm one another.
- P2It only makes sense to include in the agreement those who can keep it or break it.
- P3Animals can't take part in the agreement or threaten us in any relevant way.
- CSo we have no direct moral duties toward animals.
The idea has a long tradition, from Hobbes to contemporary versions of contractualism, such as Peter Carruthers's. It's related to A7 ("No duties, no rights"), but it rests on the origin and function of morality rather than on reciprocity of duties.
The argument is valid. Its soundness fails at P1, which confuses origin with justification, and at P2, which would exclude many humans.
Full answer
- a
Reconstruction and diagnosis
The argument can be read in three ways:
Reading What it claims Problem Descriptive People only respect those they fear False as a generalization About origin Morality was born of self-interest Origin isn't justification Normative We should only respect those who can threaten us Excludes vulnerable humans - b
Where the argument breaks
1. It excludes vulnerable humans.
Babies, small children and people with certain illnesses or disabilities have no power to threaten us or take part in agreements. By the argument, we could do to them what we do to animals.
2. The description is false.
Some people only respect those they fear, but many others protect precisely those who are defenseless. Saying "that's what humanity is like" is usually a generalization from oneself.
3. The origin is probably not that.
Studies of animal behavior suggest that morality has roots in altruistic and caring behaviors far older than any self-interested agreement.
4. Origin isn't justification.
Even if morality had been born of fear, that wouldn't show this conception is the correct one. It's like trying to prove a calculation is right by showing that's how people calculated thousands of years ago.
5. Being a beneficiary doesn't require being an agent.
Someone treated by a doctor doesn't need to be a doctor. Someone protected by morality doesn't need to be capable of acting morally (A7).
- c
Data and sources
Source What it says Note *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. I, ch. 12 Answers the appeal to self-interest and to the origin of ethics The main source for this chapter *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. I, ch. 10 Shows that the beneficiaries of ethics don't need to be moral agents Basis for point 5 Carruthers, *The Animals Issue* (1992) Defends a contractualism that denies direct duties to animals Cambridge University Press; chapter "Contractualism and animals" de Waal, *Primates and Philosophers* (2006) Argues for evolutionary roots of morality in empathy and cooperation Princeton University Press - d
The strongest counter-reply: the contract protects the vulnerable indirectly
The most serious version, Carruthers's, admits that babies don't make contracts. But it says the contractors have an interest in protecting them, because they love them and because allowing abuse against them would threaten social stability. So vulnerable humans would be protected indirectly, and animals wouldn't.
- e
Why the counter-reply doesn't reach the conclusion
Protection becomes dependent on other people's affection.
A baby with no one to love them would lose protection. Almost no one accepts that.
The same would hold for animals.
Many people love animals and are disturbed by cruelty. By the same logic, animals should also be protected indirectly.
It puts the wrong in the wrong place.
If hurting a baby is wrong only because it upsets adults, the victim isn't the baby. Most people feel the victim is the baby.
Reasoning errors
Logical
Is the form valid?
Genetic fallacy
Epistemological
Does the evidence support it?
Hasty generalization
Moral
Is the criterion coherent?
Excluding the vulnerable
Biases
False consensus
Assumes everyone acts like the person arguing
General literature on false consensus
Motivated reasoning
Chooses the moral theory that keeps the habit
Extrapolations
The principle being tested is: "we only owe respect to those who can threaten or repay us".
If it applied to…BabiesTap to see
They would have no protection of their own
No one accepts this
If it applied to…Future generationsTap to see
We couldn't wrong them, since they don't threaten us
Contradicts environmental and climate ethics
If it applied to…AnimalsTap to see
They would have no protection of their own
This is the argument's conclusion
Contradictions
Who can neither threaten nor make agreements.
Who aren't party to any contract either.
But admires those who sacrifice themselves for those who can't repay them.
What the argument gets right
What is true
Cooperation and reciprocity are an important part of moral life, and many social rules work as agreements. It's also true that only agents capable of understanding rules can be held responsible for them.
But
But being held responsible and being protected are different things. The morality we know protects many who never signed any agreement.
Connections
Usually comes before
Usually comes after
Go deeper in Questão de Ética
Chapters from the open-access collection A Journey Through Animal Ethics that discuss this argument in more detail:
- If Ethics Was Invented for Self-Protection, Is It Just to… Vol. I, ch. 12