Home / A. Sentience and moral status / Part DIR
"Species is biology, race is a social construct"
the argument tries to show that speciesism isn't like racism, because species would be a real biological category and race a social construct. But being biological doesn't make a criterion fair. A slavery based on height would use a biological trait and be as unjust as any other. Racism is unjust because it gives someone's interests biased treatment, not because of where the concept of race came from. The same holds for speciesism.
Short answer
Being biological doesn't make a criterion fair. Imagine enslaving people by height: height is biological, and that slavery would be as unjust as any other. Racism is wrong because it disregards someone's interests because of a trait that doesn't change how much they can suffer. Species does the same. And if it were ever shown that races exist biologically, racism would still be wrong.
For children
Imagine a school where the shortest children had to carry the tallest children's backpacks. Height is something about the body; it's real. Even so, the rule would be unfair, wouldn't it? What makes a rule unfair isn't whether the difference is real or made up. It's someone suffering just because they were born different.
"If height is biological, would a slavery based on height be just?"
Como pode aparecer
"Race is a social construct, species is biology."
"Speciesism isn't like racism."
"Humans and cows are different species. That's science, not prejudice."
"Species is a natural kind; race and gender aren't."
"Comparing animal farming to slavery or the Holocaust is offensive." (which is L7)
"What matters is the species, not the individual." (which is A18)
The strongest version
"You can't compare speciesism with racism. Race doesn't exist, it's a social invention. Species really exists, it's biology."
Strongest version (steelman):
- P1Racism and sexism are unjust because they use categories that are social constructs, with no real biological basis.
- P2Species is a real biological category, with genetic, reproductive and evolutionary differences.
- CSo using species as a moral criterion isn't unjust the way racism is.
Premise P2 has support: species is a scientific concept, even though there's debate about how to define it. And P1 echoes current criticism of the biological concept of race.
The argument is valid. Its soundness fails at P1: what makes racism unjust isn't the origin of the concept.
Full answer
- a
Reconstruction and diagnosis
Question The argument's answer The correct answer Is species real? Yes Yes, in general Is race real? No Scientific debate aside, it's irrelevant here What makes discrimination unjust? Using an invented category Giving less weight to someone's interests because of an irrelevant trait The argument gets the facts right and the theory of injustice wrong.
- b
Where the argument breaks
1. It doesn't explain why the criterion's origin matters.
The argument assumes, without justifying it, that a biological criterion would be fair and a social one unfair.
2. There are clearly unjust biological criteria.
Height, eye color, blood type and sex are biological. Using them to decide who may be enslaved or killed would be unjust.
3. Racism doesn't depend on the social construction thesis.
If races were shown to have some biological basis, racism would be just as unjust as before. The injustice lies in giving people's interests biased treatment.
4. Species doesn't measure what matters.
It doesn't tell us whether someone can suffer, or how much. So it's as irrelevant to moral consideration as race (A10).
5. The comparison is of structure, not of victims.
Saying speciesism and racism have the same logical structure doesn't equate the victims or minimize racism (L7).
- c
Data and sources
Source What it says Note *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. I, ch. 7 Answers the appeal to the distinction between the biological and the socially constructed The main source for this chapter *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. I, ch. 2 Shows that species, like race and gender, is an arbitrary criterion Basis for point 4 Ryder, *Speciesism* (1970) Coins the term "speciesism" by analogy with racism The original leaflet, distributed in Oxford - d
The strongest counter-reply: species carries real capacities with it
The most serious version says species doesn't matter in itself, but because it comes with real differences in capacity: language, reason, culture. Race brings none of that; species does.
- e
Why the counter-reply doesn't reach the conclusion
Then the criterion is capacity, not species.
The capacities cited don't measure suffering.
Language and culture don't say how much someone suffers when confined or killed.
The analogy with racism holds.
Racists also claimed real differences in capacity between races. The error wasn't only in the facts, but in using irrelevant capacities to deny interests.
Reasoning errors
Logical
Is the form valid?
Hidden premise
Moral
Is the criterion coherent?
Irrelevance
Appeal to nature
Biases
In-group bias
Protects the boundary of one's own group
General literature
Motivated reasoning
Looks for a difference that saves the habit
Extrapolations
The principle being tested is: "if the criterion is biological, discriminating by it isn't unjust".
If it applied to…HeightTap to see
Enslaving short people would be acceptable
No one accepts this
If it applied to…SexTap to see
Denying women rights would be acceptable
Rejected as sexism
If it applied to…SpeciesTap to see
Exploiting animals would be acceptable
This is the argument's conclusion
Contradictions
Which is also biological.
Which rests on real biological differences between the sexes.
And gives it a moral weight biology doesn't give.
What the argument gets right
What is true
Species are biological categories, and there are real differences between humans and other animals. Those differences justify different treatment in many cases: a pig doesn't need to vote or go to school.
But
But different treatment isn't disregard. A difference of species doesn't change the fact that a pig can suffer, and that's what matters when we decide whether it's fair to make him suffer.
Connections
Usually comes before
Usually comes after
Go deeper in Questão de Ética
Chapters from the open-access collection A Journey Through Animal Ethics that discuss this argument in more detail:
- If Species Are Not a Social Construct, Is Speciesism… Vol. I, ch. 7