Home / M. Wild animals, new minds and the future / Part DIR
"Suffering and death are part of nature"
being part of nature doesn't make something good or indifferent for the one who suffers. Diseases, parasites and death in childbirth are also part of human nature, and that was never a reason not to treat them. The absence of a culprit matters for judging agents, not for measuring the victims' harm.
Short answer
Disease is also part of nature, and we still treat it. No one leaves a child with an infection untreated because bacteria are natural. That no one is to blame for suffering doesn't make it any less bad for the one who suffers. The question is whether we can help without causing more harm.
For children
Catching a cold is part of life, right? Even so, when you're sick, someone looks after you, gives you medicine and a warm drink. No one says "leave it, it's natural". What's natural can hurt just the same. And when it hurts, we help if we can.
"If a disease is natural, would you stop treating it?"
Como pode aparecer
"Nature is cruel, that's how it is."
"Nature is neither good nor bad."
"Suffering is part of life."
"Wanting to end suffering in nature is denying life."
"Natural suffering is morally neutral, because it doesn't result from choices."
"It's the circle of life." (which is C7)
The strongest version
"That's just how nature is. Some eat others, some get sick, others die. It's part of it."
Strongest version (steelman):
- P1It only makes sense to speak of moral evil when there's a responsible agent.
- P2In nature, suffering is caused by processes without intention: predation, disease, climate.
- C1So natural suffering isn't a moral evil.
- C2And what isn't a moral evil gives us no reason to act.
P1 and P2 are acceptable if we're talking about blame: a hurricane is guilty of nothing. The problem lies in C2, which jumps from the absence of a culprit to the absence of a victim.
The argument is invalid: from "no one is to blame" it doesn't follow that "no one was harmed".
Full answer
- a
Reconstruction and diagnosis
The argument confuses two questions:
Question Depends on Example Is anyone to blame? There being an agent who chose An arsonist is to blame; lightning isn't Was anyone harmed? There being a victim who suffered A forest burned by lightning has as many victims as one burned by an arsonist For the one who suffers, the origin of the suffering doesn't change what they feel.
- b
Where the argument breaks
1. Neutral for whom?
Nature has no intentions, but animals have experiences. The suffering of an animal eaten alive by parasites isn't neutral for it.
2. Natural isn't a criterion of good.
In the essay Nature, John Stuart Mill observed that nature does, every day, things for which a human being would be imprisoned or hanged. Copying nature was never a good moral guide (C1).
3. We already intervene in the natural all the time.
Vaccines, antibiotics, glasses, anaesthesia, shelter from the cold: much of civilization consists of reducing natural suffering.
4. The human test.
Faced with an epidemic or an earthquake, no one says "it's part of nature, let's not help". The absence of a culprit was never a reason to deny help to humans. Denying it to animals for the same reason is using a criterion we apply only to them.
5. There's no agent, but there's someone who can help.
Ethics asks not only who caused something, but also what we, who can act, ought to do.
- c
Data and sources
Source What it says Note Mill, Nature (1874) Nature kills, tortures and destroys all the time; imitating it isn't a moral criterion Published in Three Essays on Religion Animal Ethics, "Why wild animal suffering matters" Suffering matters to the one who suffers, whatever its cause *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. VII Discusses whether natural suffering is neutral and whether nature's indifference releases us from helping Chapters 13, 15 and 16 - d
The strongest counter-reply: suffering has a function
The most serious version says pain is useful: it teaches animals to avoid danger, and natural selection depends on it. Ending natural suffering would destroy something that gives meaning to animals' lives.
- e
Why the counter-reply doesn't reach the conclusion
Function isn't wellbeing.
Pain serves the survival of genes, not the good of the individual. For the young animal that dies on its first day, it teaches nothing.
We accept relieving pain that has a function.
The pain of childbirth and of a fracture have functions, and we still use anaesthesia.
Reasoning errors
Logical
Is the form valid?
Appeal to nature
Non sequitur
Moral
Is the criterion coherent?
Confusing blame and harm
Double standard
Biases
Intention bias
Harm only seems serious when someone meant to cause it
Tomasik, "Intention-based moral reactions distort intuitions about wild animals"
Extrapolations
The principle being tested is: "suffering that's part of nature doesn't need to be relieved".
If it applied to…Human diseasesTap to see
We shouldn't treat infections, cancer or malaria
No one accepts this
If it applied to…ChildbirthTap to see
Anaesthesia would be a mistake
Some people once said so, and lost the debate
If it applied to…Natural disastersTap to see
We shouldn't help victims
Humanitarian aid exists precisely for this
Contradictions
And the disease was natural.
Earthquakes and droughts have no culprit.
Without saying its illness "is part of it".
What the argument gets right
What is true
It's right that nature isn't a moral agent and that it makes no sense to blame lions or viruses. It's also right that pain has important biological functions and that tampering with it requires great care.
But
But the question isn't whether nature is to blame. It's whether we, who can act, have reason to help those who suffer. And the natural origin of suffering has never, in any other context, been a reason not to help.
Connections
Usually comes before
Usually comes after
Go deeper in Questão de Ética
Chapters from the open-access collection A Journey Through Animal Ethics that discuss this argument in more detail:
- If Nature Is Not Evil, Is Natural Suffering Neutral? Vol. VII, ch. 15
- If Nature Is Indifferent to the Suffering of Animals, Why… Vol. VII, ch. 16
- The Objection That Suffering Has Instrumental Value Vol. VII, ch. 13
References
Philosophy
- Nature. In Three Essays on Religion.
Animal ethics and wild animals
- Animal Ethics. Why wild animal suffering matters.
- Intention-based moral reactions distort intuitions about wild animals. *Essays on Reducing Suffering*.