Home / A. Sentience and moral status / Part DIR
"I respect animals, but humans come first"
saying humans come first in any conflict is giving them a special status, a kind of trump card, that holds even when the harm to the animal is much greater. No one explains where that trump card comes from, and it wouldn't pass the test of impartiality: if you didn't know whether you'd be born human or animal, you wouldn't accept a rule that ignores your suffering just because of your species. The weight of an interest should depend on the size of the harm, not on who suffers it.
Short answer
"Coming first" can mean two things. If it means "the greater harm has priority", I agree, and the greater harm is almost always on the animal's side: a plate of meat against a whole life. If it means "the human wins even when they lose less", that's a trump card no one explains. Would you accept that rule if you didn't know whether you'd be born a human or a chicken?
For children
Imagine that, before you were born, you didn't know whether you'd be a child or a dog. And someone said: "Children always come first, even if the dog suffers a lot and the child only loses a sweet." Would you think that rule was fair, knowing you might be born a dog? Liking animals is good. But really liking them means not letting them suffer a lot so we can gain a little.
"Does coming first mean the human wins even when all that's at stake for them is the taste of a meal?"
Como pode aparecer
"I respect animals, I just think humans come first."
"Human life is worth more."
"Humans have dignity, animals don't."
"Animals are important, but they're not people."
"Humans have full moral status; animals, partial moral status."
"There are more important human problems." (which is J6)
"Humans are superior, so we can use the inferior." (which is A2)
The strongest version
"I like animals, I'm not against them. I just think that, when you have to choose, humans come first."
Strongest version (steelman):
- P1Animals have some moral value: they shouldn't be made to suffer for no reason.
- P2Humans have a higher moral status, dignity, that animals don't have.
- P3Those with higher status should be prioritized in conflicts of interest, even when they would lose less than the other.
- CSo it's acceptable to use animals for the benefit of humans.
In philosophy, this position is called the special status thesis. It has a total version (the human always comes first, however great the harm to the animal) and a limited version (the human comes first, except when the harm to the animal passes a certain point).
The argument is valid. Its soundness fails at P2, which doesn't say what dignity is or why only humans would have it, and at P3, which contradicts the idea that greater harms weigh more.
Full answer
- a
Reconstruction and diagnosis
The sentence mixes two ideas that need to be separated:
Idea What it says Problem Magnitude thesis Greater harms weigh more, whatever the species None: it's equal consideration Special status thesis Certain individuals come first even when they would lose less It has to justify the trump card Whoever accepts the first idea has no way of justifying everyday animal exploitation, because what humans gain (taste, convenience, habit) is much smaller than what animals lose (wellbeing and life). Only the second idea supports the conclusion, and that's the one that needs examining.
- b
Where the argument breaks
1. The trump card isn't explained.
2. It doesn't pass the veil of ignorance.
Proposed by John Harsanyi in 1955 and popularized by John Rawls in 1971, the test asks whether we'd accept a rule without knowing which position we'd occupy. Mark Rowlands observed that species, like race or talent, is a result of the natural lottery, and so it should also go behind the veil. There are about 8 billion humans and, by some estimates, between 1 and 10 quintillion sentient animals. Behind the veil, the chance of being born human would be minimal, and no one would accept a rule that always puts them second.
3. The same logic would downgrade humans.
Some versions give special status only to those capable of autonomy. By that rule, babies and people with certain disabilities would also come after. Almost no one accepts that, which shows the real criterion is just species (A10).
4. Even a lower weight doesn't authorize exploitation.
Suppose each animal counted for less. It doesn't follow that it may be bred and killed. Saying an interest weighs less is one thing; saying it can be sacrificed for a trivial gain is another.
5. "Coming first" is rarely at stake.
The real conflicts of everyday life aren't "save a child or a pig" (F2). They're "eat this dish or another".
- c
Data and sources
Source What it says Note *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. I, ch. 14 Distinguishes the magnitude thesis from the special status thesis and applies the veil of ignorance to the latter The main source for this chapter Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (1971) Proposes the original position and the veil of ignorance Rawls limited justice to those with a sense of justice, as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarizes Rowlands, *Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence* (1998) Extends the veil of ignorance to species, as a result of the natural lottery Chapter "Contractarianism and Animal Rights", Palgrave Macmillan - d
The strongest counter-reply: dignity comes from autonomy, not species
The most serious version doesn't talk about species. It says special status comes from the capacity to make autonomous decisions, to choose ends for one's own life, and that this is morally relevant: those who can direct their own lives have something more to lose.
- e
Why the counter-reply doesn't reach the conclusion
It excludes humans.
Babies and people without autonomy would be left without special status. Either one accepts that consequence, or the real criterion was species.
Autonomy is also luck.
No one earned being born with it, and anyone can lose it through illness or accident.
At most it explains differences in harm.
If autonomy increases what someone loses in certain cases, that's already included in the magnitude thesis. No trump card is needed.
Reasoning errors
Logical
Is the form valid?
Begging the question
Equivocation
Moral
Is the criterion coherent?
Partiality
Disproportion
Biases
In-group bias
Favors those who belong to one's own group
General literature on in-group favoritism
Motivated reasoning
The desired conclusion (to keep eating meat) chooses the premise
Extrapolations
The principle being tested is: "those with a status I assign come first, even when they lose less".
If it applied to…NationalityTap to see
A citizen's comfort would be worth more than a foreigner's life
Rejected as xenophobia
If it applied to…Cognitive capacityTap to see
An adult's leisure would be worth more than a baby's health
No one accepts this
If it applied to…SpeciesTap to see
The taste of a human meal would be worth more than an animal's life
This is the argument's conclusion
Contradictions
And accepts that they suffer and die for a small gain.
But accepts a hierarchy by species that has the same structure.
And uses autonomy to justify special status.
What the argument gets right
What is true
In real, rare conflicts where lives are at stake on both sides, there may be reasons to prioritize whoever would lose more, and sometimes that will be the human. It's also true that we have special bonds with those close to us.
But
But none of this turns "humans come first" into a license to use animals in everyday life, when what's at stake on one side is taste and, on the other, life.
Connections
Usually comes before
Usually comes after
Go deeper in Questão de Ética
Chapters from the open-access collection A Journey Through Animal Ethics that discuss this argument in more detail:
- The Appeal to Differentiated Degrees of Moral Status Vol. I, ch. 14
- An Overview of the Debate on the Moral Consideration of… Vol. I, ch. 1
References
Philosophy
- The appeal to differentiated degrees of moral status. In *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. I.
- A Theory of Justice.
- Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence.