Home / A. Sentience and moral status / Part DIR
"Humans have intrinsic value; animals have instrumental value."
saying only humans have value in themselves is asserting the conclusion without proving it. When you ask what gives humans that value, the answer is some trait, such as reason or self-awareness, that isn't present in all humans and is present, to some degree, in many animals. Even philosophers in the Kantian tradition, such as Christine Korsgaard, now conclude that sentient animals are ends in themselves too.
Short answer
Saying only humans are valuable in themselves is repeating the conclusion. When you ask why, the answer is usually reason. But babies and people with profound intellectual disabilities don't reason, and they don't lose dignity because of it. What they all have is a life that can go well or badly for themselves, and many animals have that too. Even Kantian philosophers, such as Christine Korsgaard, now argue that sentient animals are ends in themselves.
For children
If you had a pet, would it be important only because you like it, or because it has a life of its own that's good for it? It eats, plays, gets cold and gets frightened, and all of that matters to it, even when nobody's looking. That's what being valuable in itself means. Farm animals also have a life that's theirs.
"What exactly gives a baby intrinsic value that a pig doesn't have?"
Como pode aparecer
"Only humans have dignity."
"An animal is a means, not an end."
"An animal is worth what it gives us."
"Human life is sacred, a cow's isn't."
"Are you saying a pig is worth as much as a person?"
"Only man was made in the image of God." (which leads to A4)
"Only rational beings are ends in themselves."
"Human dignity is non-negotiable."
The strongest version
"Only human beings have dignity. An animal is a means, not an end."
Strongest version (steelman):
- P1Some beings have intrinsic value: they are valuable in themselves and may not be used merely as means.
- P2That value comes from rationality, from the capacity to act morally and give oneself a law, as Kant argued.
- P3Only humans have that capacity.
- CSo only humans have intrinsic value, and animals may be used as means.
The strong version has the greatest philosophical tradition of any in the catalog. Kant held that only rational beings are ends in themselves, and that our duties regarding animals are indirect: we shouldn't be cruel to them because that makes us cruel to humans.
The argument is valid. Its soundness fails at P2 and P3, which return to the problems of A1 and A11, and in a circularity: value is defined precisely by the trait one wants to use to exclude.
Full answer
- a
Reconstruction and diagnosis
The argument has a circular structure:
Step What happens Question Why do only humans have intrinsic value? Answer Because they're rational (or have a soul, or dignity) Next question Why does that trait, and not the capacity to suffer, define value? Usual answer Because it's what humans have The criterion is chosen so as to produce the conclusion. It's begging the question.
- b
Where the argument breaks
1. It doesn't protect all humans.
2. The Kantian tradition itself is revising the point.
Christine Korsgaard, one of Kant's leading interpreters, argues in Fellow Creatures (2018) that all sentient animals should be treated as ends in themselves: they have a good of their own, things can go well or badly for them from their own point of view, and that's what gives us reason to respect them.
3. Having a good of one's own is what matters.
An object only has value for someone. A sentient being has a life that matters to itself. Treating it as a mere instrument ignores exactly what distinguishes it from a chair.
4. Kant's indirect duties don't convince even those who accept them.
If the only problem with cruelty to animals were that it makes us cruel to humans, torturing an animal in secret, with no effect on anyone, wouldn't be wrong. Almost everyone thinks it is.
5. A being's value doesn't depend on what it offers.
"An animal is worth what it gives us" describes how society uses it, not what it is. The same sentence was once said about enslaved people.
- c
Data and sources
Source What it says Note Korsgaard, *Fellow Creatures* (2018) Sentient animals are ends in themselves, because they have a good of their own Oxford University Press; checked against reviews and the book's description Kant, *Lectures on Ethics* Duties regarding animals would be indirect, owed to humans The indirect duties of the Lectures on Ethics are summarized in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry "The Moral Status of Animals" Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights* (1983) Beings who are "subjects-of-a-life" have inherent value University of California Press; origin of the "subject-of-a-life" concept - d
The strongest counter-reply: dignity is a human concept
The most serious version says "dignity" and "intrinsic value" are concepts built to regulate relations among humans, within a community of moral agents, and that applying them to animals changes the meaning of the words. Animals might deserve care, but not the same kind of respect.
- e
Why the counter-reply doesn't reach the conclusion
The name doesn't matter; the fact does.
One can argue about whether the word "dignity" fits. There's still someone for whom things go well or badly.
It includes humans who aren't agents.
Babies take part in no moral community and receive full respect (A7).
"Deserving care" already rules out exploitation.
If animals deserve care, breeding them to be killed for the pleasure of taste doesn't pass that test.
Reasoning errors
Logical
Is the form valid?
Begging the question
Proves too much
Epistemological
Does the evidence support it?
Partial reading of the tradition
Moral
Is the criterion coherent?
Value measured by usefulness
Biases
Psychological essentialism
"Human dignity" seems an essence, not a criterion needing justification
Extrapolations
The principle being tested is: "only those with capacity X have value in themselves, and the rest may be used".
If it applied to…BabiesTap to see
They could be used as means, because they don't reason yet
No one accepts this
If it applied to…People with profound intellectual disabilitiesTap to see
They would lose intrinsic value
Contradicts human rights
If it applied to…A species more rational than usTap to see
It could use us as means
Whoever rejects this rejects the premise
Contradictions
Without their having the capacity used as the criterion.
If they were mere instruments, cruelty wouldn't be possible.
And not as a useful object.
What the argument gets right
What is true
The idea that some beings are valuable in themselves, and not just for their usefulness, is one of ethics' most important achievements. It protects people against being treated as instruments, and the Kantian tradition gave it a powerful formulation.
But
The mistake is restricting that achievement to one species. If what makes a being an end in itself is having a life that matters to itself, that condition neither begins nor ends at the human boundary.
Connections
Usually comes before
Usually comes after
Go deeper in Questão de Ética
Chapters from the open-access collection A Journey Through Animal Ethics that discuss this argument in more detail:
- The Appeal to Differentiated Degrees of Moral Status Vol. I, ch. 14
- Sentience and Life: What Has Value as an End and What Has… Vol. VI, ch. 16
References
Philosophy
- *Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals*. Oxford University Press.
- Lectures on Ethics.
- The Case for Animal Rights.