Home / F. Edge cases and hypotheticals / Part DIR
"So should we stop lions from hunting?"
the question is asked as a provocation, but it touches a serious issue: the suffering of wild animals. Taking that issue seriously doesn't lead to "locking up predators", but to studying carefully how to reduce suffering without causing greater harm. And whatever the answer, it doesn't favor eating meat: that there is suffering in nature doesn't authorize causing more.
Short answer
The suffering of wild animals is a serious issue, and researchers are studying ways to reduce it, such as vaccination and rescue during disasters. No one needs to "lock up predators": poorly thought-out interventions can cause more harm. But whatever the answer, it doesn't favor eating meat. That there's suffering in nature is no reason to cause more. If there's a lot of suffering we don't control, that's all the more reason not to add the suffering we do control.
For children
In nature, many animals suffer: from hunger, cold, disease and predators. That's sad, and some people study how to help, for example by vaccinating sick wild animals. But the fact that there's suffering in nature doesn't mean we can cause even more suffering.
"If suffering in nature is a problem, isn't that one more reason not to cause extra suffering?"
Como pode aparecer
"So should we stop lions from hunting?"
"Will you lock up every predator?"
"So nature is immoral?"
"Vegans want to feed tofu to tigers."
"Animal ethics leads to the absurd duty of policing nature."
"Lions eat other animals." (which is C2)
The strongest version
"Will you lock up every predator? So nature is immoral?"
Strongest version (steelman):
- P1If animal suffering matters, it also matters when caused by predators.
- P2It would be absurd to intervene in nature to prevent predation.
- P3So whoever takes animal suffering seriously reaches an absurd conclusion.
- CSo the premise that animal suffering matters must be rejected or weakened.
P1 is true. The problem lies in P2 and P3: recognizing the problem doesn't commit anyone to absurd solutions, and the conclusion doesn't apply to what we do to animals.
The argument is valid as a reductio ad absurdum. Its soundness fails at P2, which confuses "taking seriously" with "intervening in any way".
Full answer
- a
Reconstruction and diagnosis
The argument mixes up two questions:
Question Answer Should we stop causing animals suffering? Yes, whenever we can avoid it Should we intervene to reduce suffering caused by others, including in nature? Perhaps, carefully, when there are safe and effective ways The duty not to cause harm is stronger and simpler than the duty to help. The difficulty of the second question doesn't affect the first.
- b
Where the argument breaks
1. Not causing harm comes before helping.
Even those who don't think we should intervene in nature accept that we shouldn't cause unnecessary suffering.
2. Predators aren't moral agents.
The lion can't be held responsible (C2). The question isn't punishing predators, but whether we, as agents, can help the victims.
3. The issue is serious, and already studied.
The field that studies wild animal suffering analyzes interventions such as vaccination against disease, rescue during disasters and fertility control, always weighing the ecological risks.
4. Poorly thought-out interventions can make everything worse.
Removing predators from an ecosystem can cause overpopulation, starvation and more suffering. That's why taking the problem seriously demands caution, not absurd solutions.
5. The question doesn't favor meat.
Suffering in nature, whatever the answer, doesn't make suffering on farms acceptable.
- c
Data and sources
Source What it says Note Beyond veganism: wild animal suffering Presents the issue of wild animal suffering and the interventions being studied A page in this guide Questão de Ética, vol. VII, ch. 1 Argues that suffering in nature is morally relevant Luciano Carlos Cunha's collection, in line with Oscar Horta's work - d
The strongest counter-reply: if we don't intervene, animal suffering weighs little
The most serious version says that if we aren't willing to intervene in nature, it's because deep down we don't give much weight to animal suffering, and then eating meat wouldn't be serious either.
- e
Why the counter-reply doesn't reach the conclusion
Not intervening doesn't mean giving no weight.
We often don't intervene because we don't know how to help without causing more harm.
The asymmetry between causing and allowing also exists among humans.
Not saving everyone who suffers in the world doesn't make it acceptable to cause someone suffering.
Many animal advocates do support intervening.
The issue is far from ignored.
Reasoning errors
Logical
Is the form valid?
Straw man
False reductio ad absurdum
Moral
Is the criterion coherent?
Confusing causing with allowing
Biases
Motivated reasoning
The provocation serves to avoid the main question
General literature on motivated cognition
Omission bias and perpetrator bias
Suffering we don't cause doesn't seem to be our problem
Extrapolations
The principle being tested is: "if we can't prevent all suffering, we needn't avoid causing our own".
If it applied to…DiseasesTap to see
Since there are natural diseases, we could spread disease
No one accepts this
If it applied to…Natural disastersTap to see
Since there are earthquakes, we could destroy houses
No one accepts this
If it applied to…Human sufferingTap to see
Since we haven't ended all hunger, we could cause hunger
No one accepts this
Contradictions
Many people support disaster rescues and care for injured animals.
Natural disasters move people.
No one draws rules for human life from it on other subjects.
What the argument gets right
What is true
The provocation gets one thing right: if animal suffering matters, it matters in nature too. That's a conclusion many philosophers take seriously, and it goes beyond veganism. It's also true that intervening in nature is hard and risky.
But
But recognizing this problem doesn't weaken the argument against causing suffering. On the contrary: in a world with so much suffering we don't yet know how to reduce, the least we can do is not add what we can avoid.
Connections
Usually comes before
Usually comes after
Go deeper in Questão de Ética
Chapters from the open-access collection A Journey Through Animal Ethics that discuss this argument in more detail:
- What Should We Do About Animals Living in the Wild? Vol. VII, ch. 1