Home / A. Sentience and moral status / Part DIR
"Vegans anthropomorphize animals."
attributing to animals what they don't have is a mistake, but denying what they do have is another, and that's the one the evidence refutes. The primatologist Frans de Waal gave this second mistake a name: anthropodenial, the refusal to see what we have in common with other animals. Pain, fear and pleasure aren't human projections: they're capacities we share with them because we have a common evolutionary history.
Short answer
Projecting human feelings onto animals is a mistake, and denying the feelings they do have is another. Pain, fear and pleasure aren't human inventions: animals have nervous systems, physiological reactions and pain behaviors similar to ours, and the 2012 Cambridge Declaration recognized that humans aren't the only ones with the neurological basis of consciousness. Recognizing this isn't watching Disney; it's seeing what science shows.
For children
When a dog steps on a thorn and cries, he isn't pretending to be a person. He has nerves and a brain that feel pain, like yours. We don't make up that he feels it: his body shows it. Imagining that a stone feels is making things up; noticing that an animal feels is paying attention.
"When your dog cries with a hurt paw, do you also think you're projecting?"
Como pode aparecer
"You've watched too much Disney."
"You're projecting feelings."
"That's sentimentality."
"Cows don't cry, that's all in your head."
"Do you think the chicken has feelings like you?"
"Complex mental states shouldn't be attributed without evidence."
"Pain behaviors can be reflexes without experience." (which is A5)
"Vegans humanize animals."
The strongest version
"You've watched too much Disney. You're projecting human feelings onto animals."
Strongest version (steelman):
- P1Humans tend to attribute human mental states to things that don't have them, such as cars, clouds and stuffed toys.
- P2Science recommends caution: one shouldn't attribute a complex mental state to an animal if a simpler one explains the behavior.
- P3Whoever says animals suffer as we do is projecting, not observing.
- CSo moral concern for animals rests on a psychological error.
P1 and P2 are true. Scientific caution against anthropomorphism, known as Morgan's canon, is a good methodological principle. The problem lies in P3.
The argument is valid. Its soundness fails at P3: attributing pain, fear and pleasure to animals doesn't come from projection but from anatomical, physiological and behavioral evidence.
Full answer
- a
Reconstruction and diagnosis
There are two opposite mistakes, and the argument sees only one of them:
Mistake What it does Example Anthropomorphism Attributes to an animal states it doesn't have Thinking a dog feels guilty for chewing a shoe Anthropodenial Denies an animal states it does have Thinking a pig doesn't feel pain when castrated without anesthesia The term anthropodenial was proposed by Frans de Waal to name blindness to the characteristics we share with other animals.
- b
Where the argument breaks
1. Pain isn't a projection.
Mammals and birds have nociceptors, centralized nervous systems and the same chemicals linked to pain and pleasure as humans. They respond to painkillers, avoid what hurt them and change their behavior after being injured (A5).
2. Science has already spoken.
The 2012 Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness stated that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. The 2024 New York Declaration recognized strong evidence in mammals and birds and a realistic possibility in all vertebrates and many invertebrates.
3. Caution cuts both ways.
Morgan's canon asks us not to attribute more than the evidence supports. It doesn't authorize attributing less. Denying pain to an animal that shows every sign of pain also goes against the evidence.
4. The similarity has an explanation.
We share much of our evolutionary history with other mammals. It would be surprising if capacities as basic as feeling pain had arisen only in our species.
5. The argument tends to be selective.
Rarely does anyone accuse of anthropomorphism someone who says their own dog is in pain or afraid. The accusation comes up mainly when the animal is a farmed one.
- c
Data and sources
Source What it says Note The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (2012) Humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness Signed at a neuroscience conference New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness (2024) Strong evidence in mammals and birds; a realistic possibility in vertebrates and many invertebrates Signed by scientists and philosophers de Waal, Anthropomorphism and anthropodenial (1999) Proposes the term anthropodenial for the denial of shared characteristics Philosophical Topics, 27(1); checked against records and summaries Loughnan, Haslam and Bastian, 2010 Eating meat reduces the mind and moral status attributed to farmed animals Shows that the denial of mind is motivated - d
The strongest counter-reply: pain yes, complex feelings no
The most serious version grants pain and fear, but says vegans exaggerate when they talk of grief, friendship, maternal love or joy, and that those attributions really would be anthropomorphic. Moral concern should be limited to what is well established.
- e
Why the counter-reply doesn't reach the conclusion
Pain and fear are enough.
If the counter-reply grants that animals feel pain and fear, the moral question is already on the table. The discussion about complex emotions is interesting, but not necessary.
Some complex emotions have evidence.
The bond between mother and offspring, for example, is observed and measured in several species; separation causes measurable stress reactions.
Caution doesn't favor exploitation.
If we don't know exactly what an animal feels, the reasonable course is to err in favor of whoever can be harmed (A15).
Reasoning errors
Logical
Is the form valid?
False dilemma
Ad hominem
Epistemological
Does the evidence support it?
Selective use of caution
Moral
Is the criterion coherent?
Motivated denial of mind
Biases
Motivated denial of mind
The greater the interest in eating, the less mind is attributed
Functional categorization
"Food" animals are granted less mind than "pet" animals
The meat paradox
Calling it projection eases the tension between liking animals and eating them
Linked to E8
Extrapolations
The principle being tested is: "attributing feelings to other beings is projection".
If it applied to…BabiesTap to see
We couldn't say a baby feels pain, because they can't speak
Medicine learned, late, that this was a mistake
If it applied to…PetsTap to see
Saying a dog is afraid would be projection
Vets treat fear and pain in dogs
If it applied to…Animal researchTap to see
Tests couldn't be used to understand human pain
They presuppose similarity
Contradictions
And doesn't think they're anthropomorphizing.
It only makes sense because animal physiology is similar to human physiology (I1).
But offers no evidence that animals don't feel.
What the argument gets right
What is true
Caution against anthropomorphism is a good scientific principle. It's easy to project human intentions onto animals, and that can lead to real mistakes, including in caring for them. Not every animal behavior has the meaning a human would give it.
But
But caution cuts both ways. Denying what the evidence shows is also a mistake, and historically it has been the more common mistake where the animals we use are concerned. Pain and fear aren't borrowed human feelings: they're an inheritance we share.
Connections
Usually comes before
Usually comes after
Go deeper in Questão de Ética
Chapters from the open-access collection A Journey Through Animal Ethics that discuss this argument in more detail:
- Is the criterion of sentience anthropocentric at bottom? Vol. VI, ch. 2
References
Science
- The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness.
- The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness.
- Anthropomorphism and anthropodenial. Philosophical Topics, 27(1).