For the Animals
An Argument Guide
PT

Home / M. Wild animals, new minds and the future / Part DIR

M9

"Machines will never feel; robots and AIs need no rights"

The answer in one sentence

today's machines probably feel nothing. But if an artificial mind is ever capable of suffering, the material it's made of will matter no more than species does. The criterion is sentience, not biology. Since digital minds could be copied by the million, faceless and voiceless, the time to think about this is before creating them, not after.

Short answer

Today's machines probably feel nothing. But if an AI can one day suffer, being made of silicon rather than flesh won't make its suffering any less real, just as being a pig rather than a human doesn't make the pig's pain less real. That's why scientists and philosophers are already studying how to assess this, before we create minds that might suffer on an enormous scale.

For children

Today, computers don't feel anything, just like a calculator doesn't get sad. But imagine that one day someone invents a robot that really feels pain, like a dog. Then it would be wrong to hurt it, wouldn't it? What matters isn't whether someone is made of skin or metal. It's whether they can feel.

Ask a question back

"If it were proven that a machine feels pain, would you think it right to make it suffer just because it isn't made of cells?"

Como pode aparecer

"Computers don't suffer."
Everyday conversation
"It's just a program; it does what it's told."
Everyday conversation
"Now they want to give rights to ChatGPT?"
Social media
"Real animals first, robots later."
Activism
"Consciousness is an essentially biological phenomenon."
Academic version
"Sentientism is just animalism in disguise."
Disguised version

The strongest version

How it is said

"Computers don't suffer. It's just a program. Talk of robot rights is science fiction."

Strongest version (steelman):

  1. P1Only sentient beings can be harmed.
  2. P2Sentience depends on a living organism with a biological nervous system.
  3. P3Machines and programs aren't living organisms.
  4. CSo no machine can ever be harmed, and there's nothing to discuss.

P1 is this guide's own criterion. P3 is true. The problem lies in P2: we don't know whether sentience requires biology, and the main scientific theories of consciousness don't say it does.

The argument is valid, but P2 is an assumption, not an established fact.

Full answer

  1. a

    Reconstruction and diagnosis

    The argument mixes two different claims:

    ClaimStatus
    Today's AIs aren't sentientLikely, according to most researchers, though there's no certainty
    No machine can ever be sentientAn assumption without consensus; several theories of consciousness allow the possibility

    This guide holds that the moral criterion is sentience. If that's the criterion, the material a being is made of matters as little as species.

  2. b

    Where the argument breaks

    1. Substrate is like species.

    Saying only biological beings can matter repeats, at another level, the error of speciesism: choosing a trait unrelated to the capacity to suffer (A10, A24).

    2. We don't know whether consciousness requires biology.

    A 2023 report, by researchers in neuroscience, AI and philosophy, assessed AI systems in light of the main scientific theories of consciousness. It concluded that no current system is a strong candidate, but that there are no obvious technical barriers to building systems that satisfy those theories' indicators.

    3. The scale could be enormous.

    Digital minds, if sentient, could be copied by the million, run faster than ours and be used for repetitive tasks, with no one to notice. It's the kind of risk that is easier to prevent than to fix.

    4. The human test.

    If a person had parts of their brain gradually replaced by artificial components that do the same job, at what point would they stop being able to suffer? The question shows that what concerns us is experience, not material.

    5. Uncertainty calls for precaution.

    We don't need to claim machines feel in order to take the possibility seriously. It's enough to recognize that if we err on the side of indifference, the cost could be immense, as it was with animals.

  3. c

    Data and sources

    SourceWhat it saysNote
    Butlin et al., 2023, "Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence"No current AI system is a strong candidate for consciousness, but there are no obvious technical barriers to building systems that satisfy the indicators of the main theoriesA report by 19 researchers
    Long et al., 2024, "Taking AI Welfare Seriously"There is a realistic possibility that some AI systems will be conscious or robustly agentic in the near future, and companies and others should start taking this seriously
    Metzinger, 2021Argues for a moratorium on research that could create artificial sufferingJournal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness, 8(1)
    *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. IX, ch. 12Shaping emerging technologies to prevent future sufferingSee also vol. VI, ch. 3
    Birch, The Edge of Sentience (2024)Proposes treating uncertain cases, including AI, with proportionate precautionOxford University Press
  4. d

    The strongest counter-reply: giving rights to machines is dangerous

    The most serious version says: attributing sentience to machines that don't feel would be a serious mistake. Companies could use it to dodge responsibility, people could become attached to systems that only imitate emotions, and resources would be diverted from beings who certainly suffer, such as animals.

  5. e

    Why the counter-reply doesn't reach the conclusion

    The risk runs both ways.

    Attributing too much sentience is a mistake; denying it when it exists is another, potentially more serious one. The answer is to develop criteria, not to deny the question.

    Precaution isn't granting rights now.

    Taking the issue seriously today means researching, creating criteria and avoiding creating suffering through carelessness, not treating every program as a person.

    It doesn't compete with animals.

    The same principle, that sentience is what matters, protects both animals and possible artificial minds. Rejecting it in one case weakens it in the other.

Reasoning errors

Logical

Is the form valid?

Begging the question
Assumes only the biological can feel, which is what's under discussion
Undue generalization
From today's machines it concludes about all possible ones

Epistemological

Does the evidence support it?

Certainty without basis
Treats an open scientific question as settled

Moral

Is the criterion coherent?

Irrelevant criterion
The material a being is made of, like species, doesn't measure the capacity to suffer

Biases

In-group bias

Only beings similar to us seem capable of feeling

Caviola, Everett and Faber, 2019

Motivated denial of mind

Recognizing mind in what we use would bring obligations

Bastian et al., 2012

Status quo bias

What has never existed seems impossible

Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988

Extrapolations

The principle being tested is: "only biological beings can have interests that matter".

If it applied to…A person with artificial brain partsTap to see

They'd lose moral status as they were replaced

No one accepts this

If it applied to…A demonstrably sentient AITap to see

It could be made to suffer without limit

Contradicts the sentience criterion itself

If it applied to…Extraterrestrials of a different chemistryTap to see

They wouldn't count, if not "biological" like us

Shows the criterion is arbitrary

Contradictions

Rejects speciesism.

But accepts a criterion of the same structure, based on material.

Is moved by artificial characters in films.

Recognizing, in fiction, that their suffering would matter if it were real.

Accepts precaution for other technological risks.

But not for this one.

What the argument gets right

What is true

It's right that today's machines probably don't feel, that many people attribute emotions to systems that only imitate them, and that this confusion can be exploited. It's also right that animals are real sentient beings suffering now, in enormous numbers.

But

But the criterion that protects animals is the same one that would protect an artificial mind, if one existed. Thinking about it in advance is cheaper than repeating with machines the mistake we made with animals.

Connections

Usually comes before

A10 They're just animals.The species boundary becomes a boundary of material
A15 Where do you draw the line? Insects? Bacteria?The boundary question reaches machines
M9this argument

Usually comes after

M12 That's science fiction; we have real problems nowThe possibility is dismissed as fantasy
M11 Those not yet born don't matterFuture minds don't exist yet either
A24 Species is biology, race is a social constructThe biological criterion returns, now against machines

Go deeper in Questão de Ética

Chapters from the open-access collection A Journey Through Animal Ethics that discuss this argument in more detail:

References