Home / M. Wild animals, new minds and the future / Part DIR
"Machines will never feel; robots and AIs need no rights"
today's machines probably feel nothing. But if an artificial mind is ever capable of suffering, the material it's made of will matter no more than species does. The criterion is sentience, not biology. Since digital minds could be copied by the million, faceless and voiceless, the time to think about this is before creating them, not after.
Short answer
Today's machines probably feel nothing. But if an AI can one day suffer, being made of silicon rather than flesh won't make its suffering any less real, just as being a pig rather than a human doesn't make the pig's pain less real. That's why scientists and philosophers are already studying how to assess this, before we create minds that might suffer on an enormous scale.
For children
Today, computers don't feel anything, just like a calculator doesn't get sad. But imagine that one day someone invents a robot that really feels pain, like a dog. Then it would be wrong to hurt it, wouldn't it? What matters isn't whether someone is made of skin or metal. It's whether they can feel.
"If it were proven that a machine feels pain, would you think it right to make it suffer just because it isn't made of cells?"
Como pode aparecer
"Computers don't suffer."
"It's just a program; it does what it's told."
"Now they want to give rights to ChatGPT?"
"Real animals first, robots later."
"Consciousness is an essentially biological phenomenon."
"Sentientism is just animalism in disguise."
The strongest version
"Computers don't suffer. It's just a program. Talk of robot rights is science fiction."
Strongest version (steelman):
- P1Only sentient beings can be harmed.
- P2Sentience depends on a living organism with a biological nervous system.
- P3Machines and programs aren't living organisms.
- CSo no machine can ever be harmed, and there's nothing to discuss.
P1 is this guide's own criterion. P3 is true. The problem lies in P2: we don't know whether sentience requires biology, and the main scientific theories of consciousness don't say it does.
The argument is valid, but P2 is an assumption, not an established fact.
Full answer
- a
Reconstruction and diagnosis
The argument mixes two different claims:
Claim Status Today's AIs aren't sentient Likely, according to most researchers, though there's no certainty No machine can ever be sentient An assumption without consensus; several theories of consciousness allow the possibility This guide holds that the moral criterion is sentience. If that's the criterion, the material a being is made of matters as little as species.
- b
Where the argument breaks
1. Substrate is like species.
2. We don't know whether consciousness requires biology.
A 2023 report, by researchers in neuroscience, AI and philosophy, assessed AI systems in light of the main scientific theories of consciousness. It concluded that no current system is a strong candidate, but that there are no obvious technical barriers to building systems that satisfy those theories' indicators.
3. The scale could be enormous.
Digital minds, if sentient, could be copied by the million, run faster than ours and be used for repetitive tasks, with no one to notice. It's the kind of risk that is easier to prevent than to fix.
4. The human test.
If a person had parts of their brain gradually replaced by artificial components that do the same job, at what point would they stop being able to suffer? The question shows that what concerns us is experience, not material.
5. Uncertainty calls for precaution.
We don't need to claim machines feel in order to take the possibility seriously. It's enough to recognize that if we err on the side of indifference, the cost could be immense, as it was with animals.
- c
Data and sources
Source What it says Note Butlin et al., 2023, "Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence" No current AI system is a strong candidate for consciousness, but there are no obvious technical barriers to building systems that satisfy the indicators of the main theories A report by 19 researchers Long et al., 2024, "Taking AI Welfare Seriously" There is a realistic possibility that some AI systems will be conscious or robustly agentic in the near future, and companies and others should start taking this seriously Metzinger, 2021 Argues for a moratorium on research that could create artificial suffering Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness, 8(1) *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. IX, ch. 12 Shaping emerging technologies to prevent future suffering See also vol. VI, ch. 3 Birch, The Edge of Sentience (2024) Proposes treating uncertain cases, including AI, with proportionate precaution Oxford University Press - d
The strongest counter-reply: giving rights to machines is dangerous
The most serious version says: attributing sentience to machines that don't feel would be a serious mistake. Companies could use it to dodge responsibility, people could become attached to systems that only imitate emotions, and resources would be diverted from beings who certainly suffer, such as animals.
- e
Why the counter-reply doesn't reach the conclusion
The risk runs both ways.
Attributing too much sentience is a mistake; denying it when it exists is another, potentially more serious one. The answer is to develop criteria, not to deny the question.
Precaution isn't granting rights now.
Taking the issue seriously today means researching, creating criteria and avoiding creating suffering through carelessness, not treating every program as a person.
It doesn't compete with animals.
The same principle, that sentience is what matters, protects both animals and possible artificial minds. Rejecting it in one case weakens it in the other.
Reasoning errors
Logical
Is the form valid?
Begging the question
Undue generalization
Epistemological
Does the evidence support it?
Certainty without basis
Moral
Is the criterion coherent?
Irrelevant criterion
Biases
Extrapolations
The principle being tested is: "only biological beings can have interests that matter".
If it applied to…A person with artificial brain partsTap to see
They'd lose moral status as they were replaced
No one accepts this
If it applied to…A demonstrably sentient AITap to see
It could be made to suffer without limit
Contradicts the sentience criterion itself
If it applied to…Extraterrestrials of a different chemistryTap to see
They wouldn't count, if not "biological" like us
Shows the criterion is arbitrary
Contradictions
But accepts a criterion of the same structure, based on material.
Recognizing, in fiction, that their suffering would matter if it were real.
But not for this one.
What the argument gets right
What is true
It's right that today's machines probably don't feel, that many people attribute emotions to systems that only imitate them, and that this confusion can be exploited. It's also right that animals are real sentient beings suffering now, in enormous numbers.
But
But the criterion that protects animals is the same one that would protect an artificial mind, if one existed. Thinking about it in advance is cheaper than repeating with machines the mistake we made with animals.
Connections
Usually comes before
Usually comes after
Go deeper in Questão de Ética
Chapters from the open-access collection A Journey Through Animal Ethics that discuss this argument in more detail:
- Shaping Emerging Technologies to Prevent Future Suffering Vol. IX, ch. 12
- Does the criterion of sentience discriminate against… Vol. VI, ch. 3
References
Science and philosophy of mind
- Consciousness in artificial intelligence: insights from the science of consciousness. arXiv:2308.08708.
- Taking AI welfare seriously. arXiv:2411.00986.
- Artificial suffering: an argument for a global moratorium on synthetic phenomenology. *Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness*, 8(1).
- The Edge of Sentience. Oxford University Press.
Reducing suffering
- Machine sentience and robot rights. *Essays on Reducing Suffering*.
- Center for Reducing Suffering. The AI welfare question.