Home / M. Wild animals, new minds and the future / Part DIR
"Those not yet born don't matter"
those not yet born feel nothing today, but they will feel what we leave them. That's why burying toxic waste that will poison children fifty years from now is wrong, even though the victims don't exist yet. When suffering happens doesn't change how much it hurts, and decisions made now, about technology, institutions and who counts morally, will affect immense numbers of beings, human and animal.
Short answer
Those not yet born feel nothing today, but they'll feel what we leave them. That's why it's wrong to bury toxic waste that will poison children decades from now. The same goes for animals: today's decisions about farming, technology and who counts morally will affect billions of beings yet to be born.
For children
If you plant a tree today, the person who sits in its shade may be a child who hasn't even been born yet. And if you throw rubbish in the river today, the one who suffers may be someone who hasn't been born yet either. What we do now reaches those who come later, people and animals.
"Is burying toxic waste that will poison children fifty years from now wrong, even though they don't exist yet?"
Como pode aparecer
"Let the future sort itself out."
"Future beings are just possibilities."
"Today's problems first, the rest later."
"Longtermism is an excuse to ignore those suffering now."
"There are no obligations toward merely possible people."
"That's science fiction; we have real problems now." (which is M12)
The strongest version
"I care about the people who exist now. Let the future sort itself out."
Strongest version (steelman):
- P1Only beings that exist can have interests.
- P2Future beings don't exist yet; they're only possibilities.
- P3Possibilities can't be harmed.
- CSo we have no duties toward future beings.
P2 is true. The problem lies in P1 and P3: future beings, when they exist, will have real interests, and our actions today can harm them.
The argument is valid in form, but not sound: it confuses not existing yet with never being affected.
Full answer
- a
Reconstruction and diagnosis
The argument confuses two things:
Claim Status Future beings feel nothing today True Future beings can't be harmed by what we do today False: when they exist, they'll suffer the consequences Temporal impartiality is the idea that suffering doesn't matter less because it happens a hundred years from now, just as it doesn't matter less because it happens on another continent.
- b
Where the argument breaks
1. The toxic waste case.
Almost everyone agrees it's wrong to bury waste that will contaminate whoever lives there in the future. If future beings didn't matter, there'd be nothing wrong with it.
2. Veganism already thinks about the future.
Much of the impact of no longer buying animal products concerns animals not yet born, who will no longer be bred to suffer. Whoever accepts this already accepts that future beings matter.
3. The human test.
Climate policy, pensions, forest preservation and pandemic prevention are decisions taken today with people yet to be born in mind. No one considers them absurd. Applying the same reasoning to animals and other sentient beings is simply being consistent.
4. Future numbers could be immense.
If civilization lasts a long time, the number of sentient beings affected by today's decisions, humans, animals and perhaps artificial minds, could far exceed that of everyone who has ever lived.
5. Thinking about the future doesn't require ignoring the present.
Many actions that reduce future suffering, such as widening the moral circle and fighting speciesism, also help now.
- c
Data and sources
Source What it says Note *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. IX, ch. 2 Temporal impartiality: what it is, and why it matters See also ch. 3, on future beings as merely potential beings Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984) Discusses our obligations to future generations, including the non-identity problem Oxford University Press MacAskill, What We Owe the Future (2022) Argues that positively influencing the long-term future is a moral priority Basic Books Center for Reducing Suffering, introduction to s-risks Introduces the risks of suffering on an astronomical scale in the future - d
The strongest counter-reply: the future is too uncertain
The most serious version says: even if future beings matter, we don't know what will happen or which actions today will have an effect. Focusing on the distant future would trade certain, present suffering for uncertain bets.
- e
Why the counter-reply doesn't reach the conclusion
It changes the subject.
It moves from "do future beings matter?" to "can we help them?". The answer to the first is already yes.
Some actions are worthwhile in almost every scenario.
Spreading the idea that all sentient beings matter, strengthening institutions and preventing technologies that cause mass suffering are good bets in almost any future.
Uncertainty isn't zero.
We also act under uncertainty on climate and public health, and we don't stop planning because of it.
Reasoning errors
Logical
Is the form valid?
Equivocation
Moral
Is the criterion coherent?
Temporal partiality
Double standard
Epistemological
Does the evidence support it?
Hyperbolic discounting
Biases
Temporal discounting
What's far away in time seems worth less
Literature on hyperbolic discounting in behavioral economics
Identifiable victim
Future beings have no face or name
Literature on the identifiable victim effect
Extrapolations
The principle being tested is: "we only have duties toward those who exist now".
If it applied to…Toxic wasteTap to see
Burying it would be acceptable if the victims weren't born yet
No one accepts this
If it applied to…ClimateTap to see
There'd be no moral reason to cut emissions for those yet to be born
Contradicts environmental ethics
If it applied to…Farmed animalsTap to see
It would be indifferent how many animals will be born to suffer
Contradicts veganism itself
Contradictions
Though it will only harm those not yet born.
Which mainly benefits future generations.
Including those not yet born.
What the argument gets right
What is true
It's right that present suffering is certain and urgent, that the future is uncertain, and that there's a risk of using the distant future as an excuse to ignore those suffering today. It's also right that there are hard philosophical debates about beings who may or may not come to exist.
But
But none of this makes future beings irrelevant. Suffering doesn't matter less because it happens a hundred years from now, and many of the decisions that will determine it are being made now.
Connections
Usually comes before
Usually comes after
Go deeper in Questão de Ética
Chapters from the open-access collection A Journey Through Animal Ethics that discuss this argument in more detail:
- Temporal Impartiality: What It Is and Why It Matters Vol. IX, ch. 2
- The Objection That Future Beings Are Merely Potential Beings Vol. IX, ch. 3
References
Philosophy
- Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
- What We Owe the Future. Basic Books.