Home / A. Sentience and moral status / Part DIR
"Killing without pain isn't harm."
death harms the one who dies because it takes away all the good experiences they would still have had. That's why killing a person in their sleep, without pain or fear, is still one of the worst wrongs there are. Farmed animals are killed very young, far from the natural end of their lives, and lose almost everything they had ahead of them. A painless death removes the suffering of the moment, not the harm.
Short answer
Death harms the one who dies because it takes away everything they would still live. That's why killing a person in their sleep, without pain, is a very serious crime and not a neutral act. Animals don't make plans for next year, but they have a future of good experiences, and they lose that future when they're killed. And farmed animals are killed very young: they lose almost all the life they would have had.
For children
Imagine someone takes a puppy from your house while he's asleep, and he never wakes up. He didn't feel any pain. But he lost all the walks, the games and the cuddles he was still going to have. That's bad for him, not just for you. It's the same with farm animals: even without pain, they lose the whole life they had ahead of them.
"Doesn't killing someone in their sleep, without pain, harm that person?"
Como pode aparecer
"If it didn't suffer, what's the problem?"
"They don't know they're going to die."
"They have no sense of the future."
"It died without noticing, better than dying of disease."
"Do you think the chicken makes plans for next year?"
"The problem is suffering, not death." (which leads to B1)
"Beings without time-relative interests aren't harmed by a painless death."
"A chicken has a short life anyway, so killing it is a small harm."
"A pig doesn't read or listen to music; its life is worth less."
"If the animal goes to a better place, killing it doesn't harm it."
"They had a good life and a quick death." (which is B5)
The strongest version
"If the animal didn't suffer, what's the problem? It doesn't even know it's going to die."
Strongest version (steelman):
- P1Something only harms someone if it's experienced as bad.
- P2An instant, painless death isn't experienced: after it, there's no one left to miss anything.
- P3Animals have no plans or awareness of their own future, so they lose nothing they already desired.
- CSo killing an animal painlessly doesn't harm it.
The strong version has a long history. Epicurus already said that death is nothing to us, because when it is here, we are not. And P3 appears in serious authors, who distinguish beings with and without awareness of their own future.
The argument is valid. Its soundness fails at P1, which no one accepts in their own case, and at P3, which confuses desiring the future with having a future to lose.
Full answer
- a
Reconstruction and diagnosis
The argument depends on an idea about what it is to be harmed. There are two answers in philosophy:
View What makes death bad Consequence Experiential (Epicurus) Only what is felt can be bad A painless death would harm no one, not even humans Deprivation (Nagel) Death is bad because it takes away the goods life would still have brought Death harms anyone who had a good future ahead The argument uses the first view for animals and the second for humans. Whoever thinks killing a person in their sleep harms them has already accepted the deprivation view, and it applies to any being with a future of experiences.
- b
Where the argument breaks
1. No one accepts P1 in their own case.
If only what is felt harms, killing a healthy person while they sleep wouldn't be bad for them. Almost everyone rejects that conclusion, and that's exactly why the philosopher Thomas Nagel argued, in 1970, that death is bad because of what it deprives us of.
2. You don't need to plan the future to lose it.
A baby makes no plans, and yet their death takes a whole life from them. What matters isn't desiring the future, but having a future of good experiences that death eliminates.
3. Farmed animals lose almost everything.
Broiler chickens and pigs are slaughtered with a fraction of the life they would have had. On the deprivation view, the loss is proportional to the future taken, and in their case it's almost the whole life.
4. The argument doesn't address suffering.
5. It's used selectively.
No one accepts the painless death of a healthy dog as neutral. The argument only shows up when the victim is a farmed animal.
6. Intellectual pleasures aren't the only ones that count.
To say a pig loses little by dying because it doesn't read or listen to music, you'd have to show that non-intellectual pleasures are worth almost nothing. But being with those you're fond of, eating, playing and resting in the sun are worth a lot, to us as well. And seeing a loved one again after years isn't an intellectual pleasure, and may be worth more than many intellectual activities.
7. Little time ahead isn't little to lose.
We don't accept that killing an old person is a small harm just because they have fewer years ahead. Besides, broiler chickens are slaughtered at around six weeks, when they could live for years: they lose almost all their possible life. And there are indications that small animals perceive time faster, which would make their lives longer on the inside than they look from the outside.
8. The hypothesis of a better life after death doesn't authorize killing.
We don't know whether it exists or whether it would be better. We do know, on the other hand, what the animal's life would be like if it went on living. And no one accepts this reasoning for killing happy humans.
- c
Data and sources
Source What it says Note Nagel, *Death* (1970) Death is bad for the one who dies because it deprives them of the goods life would still have brought Noûs, 4(1); the origin of the so-called deprivation view McMahan, *The Ethics of Killing* (2002) Proposes the time-relative interest account: the gravity of death depends on the future lost and the psychological connection to it Oxford University Press; basis of the strongest counter-reply Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus "Death is nothing to us" Origin of the experiential view *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. III, ch. 4 To conclude that death barely harms those without intellectual pleasures, you'd have to show the other pleasures are worth almost nothing Basis for point 6 *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. III, ch. 10 Having little time left doesn't make death a small harm; subjective time perception may be faster in small animals Basis for point 7 *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. III, ch. 13 Uncertainty about an afterlife doesn't justify killing someone who has a good life Basis for point 8 - d
The strongest counter-reply: an animal's death is a lesser harm
The most serious version accepts the deprivation view but says the harm of death also depends on the psychological connection between a being and its future. Jeff McMahan called these time-relative interests: those with plans, memory and self-awareness lose more by dying. Animals would have a weaker connection, and so their death would be a lesser harm than an adult human's.
- e
Why the counter-reply doesn't reach the conclusion
A lesser harm is still a harm.
The counter-reply abandons the conclusion "killing without pain isn't harm" and starts discussing how much harm it is. It no longer authorizes killing.
The harm has to be weighed against the benefit.
On the other side is a pleasure of taste (J11). Even a reduced harm weighs more.
The same account would downgrade humans.
Animals have a connection to the future.
Many remember, anticipate and have stable preferences. The difference is one of degree, not of kind.
Reasoning errors
Logical
Is the form valid?
Proves too much
Double standard
Epistemological
Does the evidence support it?
Confusing desiring with having
Moral
Is the criterion coherent?
Reducing harm to pain
Silence about suffering
Biases
The meat paradox
Attributing less mind to the animals we eat makes their death less troubling
Cognitive dissonance
The tension between liking animals and eating them is eased by denying that death harms them
Extrapolations
The principle being tested is: "a painless death doesn't harm the one who dies".
If it applied to…People asleepTap to see
Killing them without their noticing wouldn't be bad for them
Contradicts one of our firmest moral judgments
If it applied to…BabiesTap to see
Killing them painlessly wouldn't harm them, because they make no plans
No one accepts this
If it applied to…PetsTap to see
Putting down a healthy dog painlessly would be neutral
Animal advocates and guardians reject this
If it applied to…People without familyTap to see
If no one missed them and there were no pain, the death would have no victim
The harm belongs to the one who loses their life
Contradictions
The absence of pain has never been a mitigating factor.
Even when the pet didn't suffer, the loss is felt as the pet's own.
The lack of projects doesn't reduce their protection.
No one would accept being killed painlessly for having no plans for tomorrow.
What the argument gets right
What is true
There's something right here. Pain and fear at the moment of death are real harms, and reducing them matters. The philosophy of death is also genuinely difficult, and there's serious debate about how much death harms different beings. It's reasonable to think that the death of a being with long life projects may be, in some sense, a greater loss.
But
But none of this makes death a non-harm. Whoever dies loses everything they would still live, and farmed animals lose almost their whole life. A painless death is better than a painful one; it isn't better than staying alive.
Connections
Usually comes before
Usually comes after
Go deeper in Questão de Ética
Chapters from the open-access collection A Journey Through Animal Ethics that discuss this argument in more detail:
- What Does the Harm of Death Consist Of? Vol. III, ch. 1
- Discussing the Claim That Animals Are Not Harmed by Death Vol. III, ch. 2
- Are Those Incapable of Intellectual Pleasures Only… Vol. III, ch. 4
- The Claim That Having Little Time Left Makes Death a… Vol. III, ch. 10
- Further Reflections: Death, Annihilation, Rational… Vol. III, ch. 13
References
Philosophy
- Death. *Noûs*, 4(1).
- The Ethics of Killing. Oxford University Press.
- Epicurus. Letter to Menoeceus.
Psychology
- The role of meat consumption in the denial of moral status and mind to meat animals. *Appetite*, 55(1).
- The moral standing of animals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 116(6).
A Journey Through Animal Ethics
- Are those incapable of intellectual pleasures only slightly harmed by death? In *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. III.
- The claim that having little time left makes death a small harm. In *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. III.
- Further reflections: death, annihilation, rational decision, and probabilities. In *A Journey Through Animal Ethics*, vol. III.